Izu: Journal of Critical Perspectives

ISSN E-1595-9236 (Online)
Vol. 4· No. 2· 2026
pp. 60–68

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 31 May 2026
Revised 16 Sept 2026
Accepted 25 Oct 2026
Published 28 Oct 2026

KEYWORDS
Remedial responsibility
Terrorism
Nigeria
Boko Haram
ISWAP
Insurgency

FUNDING
This research received no external funding.

LICENCE
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HOW TO CITE:
Olatade, D. P. (2026). Who Ought to Act? Applying David Miller's Remedial Responsibility to Displacement Caused by Terrorism in Northern Nigeria. *Izu: Journal of Critical Perspectives, 4*(2), 60–68. https://doi.org/10.68251/IZU.4.1.8

RESEARCH ARTICLE https://doi.org/10.68251/IZU.4.1.8

Who Ought to Act? Applying David Miller's Remedial Responsibility to Displacement Caused by Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

Damilola Peter Olatade
Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Nigeria
Correspondence: damilola.olatade@lasu.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the normative question of who ought to act in responding to terrorism-induced displacement in Northern Nigeria through David Miller's theory of remedial responsibility. The central problem is that the displacement generated by Boko Haram and ISWAP has produced persistent humanitarian and justice concerns, while responsibility for remedying existing harms and preventing their recurrence remains diffuse and inadequately theorised. Although responsibility may initially be attributed to those who causally produce displacement, the agents responsible for causing harm may lack the capacity or willingness to provide effective remedy. Conversely, agents possessing the institutional capacity and political connection necessary for remediation may themselves be implicated in governance failures, inadequate preventive security, or other conditions that contribute to vulnerability. This creates a philosophical problem concerning the allocation, legitimacy, and accountability of remedial responsibility. Using a normative philosophical methodology grounded in conceptual analysis and critical application of Miller's account to the Nigerian context, the paper examines causal contribution, moral fault, capacity, and special connection as criteria for determining who ought to assume responsibility for displaced populations. The findings indicate that while terrorist organisations bear primary causal and moral responsibility for displacement, their lack of remedial capacity makes it necessary to assign substantial responsibility to the Nigerian state and other capable institutional actors. However, the state's position as both principal remedial agent and an institution potentially implicated in conditions that sustain vulnerability generates a culpable-remediator problem requiring stronger mechanisms of accountability, independent oversight, and appropriately structured regional and international support. The paper further argues that Miller's remedial framework, though primarily concerned with responding to completed harms, can be philosophically developed to accommodate a forward-looking preventive dimension grounded particularly in capacity, special connection, and the reasonable foreseeability of serious harm. Preventive responsibility, on this account, does not require agents to guarantee the elimination of terrorism but imposes proportionate duties to reduce foreseeable risks of displacement and protect vulnerable populations. The paper contributes to the philosophical literature on responsibility by developing a preventive extension of remedial responsibility while clarifying the moral limits of assigning primary remedial authority to institutions that may themselves bear partial responsibility for conditions of harm. It thereby proposes a framework of responsibility that connects remediation, prevention, institutional accountability, and the protection of displaced populations within the Nigerian context.

Introduction

Terrorism has emerged as a highly compelling issue in security studies, particularly after the international security framework underwent significant

changes in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (Kegley, 2003). Consequently, terrorism has increasingly taken on a transnational dimension within the global governance framework (Enders & Sandler, 2012). The rise in terrorist violence in Northern Nigeria, particularly involving Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), has contributed significantly to one of the largest internal displacement crises in the region. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 2.3 million internally displaced persons were identified across the six states of North-East Nigeria in its Displacement Tracking Matrix assessment (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2026). UNHCR similarly reports that Nigeria continues to experience one of Africa's largest internal displacement situations, with the North-East accounting for a substantial proportion of the displaced population (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2026). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) also estimates that Nigeria had approximately 3.7 million internally displaced persons at the end of 2024, reflecting the continuing scale and persistence of displacement in the country (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC], 2025). Terrorism-induced displacement has not only forced people from their homes but has also disrupted livelihoods, separated families and communities, and exposed displaced populations to persistent humanitarian vulnerabilities (IOM, 2026; UNHCR, 2026). Although empirical research has extensively documented the magnitude, causes, and consequences of this displacement (IDMC, 2025; IOM, 2026), comparatively less attention has been devoted to the fundamental moral question underlying policy and humanitarian responses: who ought to take responsibility for addressing the suffering experienced by displaced persons? The absence of a sufficiently developed ethical framework for determining responsibility can contribute to fragmented responses, weak accountability, and the treatment of displacement primarily as a charitable concern rather than as a matter of moral and institutional obligation.

Dominant strategies regarding terrorism-related displacement in Northern Nigeria frequently shift between placing full blame on insurgent groups, invoking the constitutional obligations of the Nigerian State or shifting accountability to international humanitarian organizations. Nonetheless, each of these approaches remains normatively insufficient. Attributing responsibility to terrorist organizations does not significantly reduce suffering, considering their inability and lack of desire to offer reparations (Olatade, 2025). State-focused strategies often minimize structural shortcomings and limitations in capacity, whereas humanitarian models usually neutralize accountability by presenting intervention as generosity instead of equity. As a result, displaced individuals find themselves in a moral gray area where their pain is widely recognized yet not adequately claimed by any accountable party.

This study addresses this normative void by utilizing David Miller's concept of remedial responsibility to examine the problem of terrorism-related displacement in Northern Nigeria. Miller's account provides a forward-looking approach to responsibility, shifting attention from the question of who is blameworthy for a harm to the question of who ought to act to remedy it. His framework identifies factors such as causal responsibility, moral responsibility, capacity, and special connection as relevant considerations in determining remedial responsibility (Miller, 2007). However, Miller's account is situated within a broader philosophical debate concerning the allocation of responsibility for injustice. Iris Marion Young's social connection model, for instance, argues that responsibility for structural injustice may be shared among agents who participate in social processes that produce unjust outcomes, even where they are not individually blameworthy (Young, 2011). This perspective is particularly relevant to displacement because the persistence of humanitarian suffering may involve multiple institutional and social actors whose responsibilities cannot be reduced to direct causation. Similarly, Goodin's vulnerability-based account grounds moral responsibility in relationships of dependency and vulnerability, suggesting that those who possess the capacity to protect vulnerable persons may acquire special responsibilities toward them (Goodin, 1985). Related discussions of remedial responsibility and global justice further consider when responsibility for addressing serious harm may extend beyond the state in which the harm occurs (Barry, 2005; Wenar, 2006). Against this broader theoretical background, this paper applies Miller's framework to argue that responsibility for terrorism-induced displacement cannot be confined to identifying the perpetrators of violence. Rather, remedial responsibility should also be assigned to actors who possess the capacity, institutional position, and relevant connections necessary to provide meaningful redress, particularly the Nigerian state, while also considering the responsibilities of regional and international actors.

This paper aims to show how remedial responsibility can clarify moral duties in situations of persistent insecurity and forced migration in the Global South. It argues that a responsibility allocation based on ethics

is essential for sustainable solutions to displacement, such as resettlement, reconstruction, and reintegration, and for advancing from reactive humanitarianism to justice-focused governance.

Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

Terrorism has become one of the most enduring and intricate security issues facing Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the nation. In the last ten years, northern Nigeria has faced ongoing insurgent attacks mainly fueled by extremist groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Dan-Azumi, 2025). These factions use strategies like bombings, abductions, mass murders, and assaults on government entities to undermine the Nigerian state and enforce their ideological objectives. Following the intensification of the insurgency in 2009, terrorism has led to tens of thousands of fatalities and the displacement of millions throughout northeastern Nigeria, resulting in one of the most critical humanitarian crises in Africa (Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, 2026). Current academic discourse increasingly acknowledges that terrorism in northern Nigeria is not solely a security issue but a complex crisis stemming from ideological extremism, socio-economic exclusion, and failures in governance (Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, 2026).

The rise of terrorism in northern Nigeria is closely linked to the emergence of Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group established in the early 2000s by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State. At first, the movement functioned as a radical religious organization that dismissed Western education and secular authority, promoting the creation of a society strictly ruled by Islamic law. Nevertheless, the group evolved into a violent insurgency following Yusuf's death in confrontations with Nigerian security forces in 2009. After this incident, Boko Haram implemented more aggressive strategies, such as suicide bombings, armed raids on communities, and assaults on government institutions. The rebellion quickly spread throughout multiple states in northeastern Nigeria, especially Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Shalangwa, 2021). Researchers contend that Boko Haram's evolution from a marginal religious group into a violent terrorist entity demonstrates how unaddressed socio-political issues and government oppression can fuel radicalization in extremist movements (Adedeji, 2024).

The dynamics of terrorism in northern Nigeria have changed considerably over time. A significant development took place in 2016 when Boko Haram divided into opposing factions due to internal ideological disagreements. One group stayed loyal to Abubakar Shekau, whereas another group swore loyalty to the Islamic State and came to be called the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This fragmentation has made the security situation in northern Nigeria more complex, as rival factions not only attack the Nigerian state but also clash violently with one another for territorial dominance and influence within the Lake Chad Basin (Mahmood, 2017). The contention between Boko Haram and ISWAP highlights the flexible and responsive characteristics of modern terrorist organizations functioning in the area. Even with military actions taken against them, these groups persist in reorganizing, attracting new members, and executing attacks on civilian and military sites.

Terrorism in northern Nigeria continues to be persistent despite ongoing counter-insurgency efforts. For example, rebel factions have persisted in launching assaults on civilian populations, roadways, and military sites throughout the northeastern area. Reports reveal that the insurgency has led to more than 35,000 civilian fatalities and has displaced over two million individuals in Nigeria’s northeast since its inception. These numbers underscore the scale of the humanitarian crisis caused by terrorism in the area. Despite the Nigerian military's success in diminishing the operational strength of insurgent groups, assaults still take place in distant rural regions where government presence is minimal.

It is important to highlight that the ongoing presence of terrorism in northern Nigeria is strongly associated with fundamental socio-economic difficulties in the area. Northern Nigeria is marked by high levels of poverty, lack of jobs, and restricted educational opportunities, especially for the youth. These circumstances foster an environment conducive to extremist recruitment and radicalization. Research carried out in Borno State by Samson et al. shows that many respondents link the increase of Boko Haram to factors such as poverty, youth joblessness, corruption, and governmental negligence. The belief that the government has not delivered essential social services and economic opportunities fosters sentiments of marginalization and injustice, which extremist organizations use to recruit members. In numerous instances, insurgent organizations offer financial rewards, social recognition, and ideological motivation to disenfranchised young people, thus bolstering their recruitment channels (Samson, Ogah, & Sangari, 2025).

In northern Nigeria, terrorism is significantly fueled by ideological indoctrination and religious extremism (Uganden & Akuraga, 2025). Boko Haram’s belief system is based on a radical understanding of Islam that opposes Western education, democratic principles, and secular governance (Uganden & Akuraga, 2025).

Utilizing propaganda and religious stories, the group presents its violent actions as jihad intended to cleanse society of perceived moral decay and Western influence (Uganden & Akuraga, 2025). This ideological structure allows terrorist leaders to rationalize the use of violence against civilians, religious minorities, and governmental bodies. Adedeji (2024) states that the distortion of religious teachings and the exploitation of Islamic principles have played a key role in Boko Haram's recruitment efforts and mobilization tactics.

Another significant dimension of terrorism in northern Nigeria concerns the social and gender dynamics associated with insurgency. Although women and girls are frequently represented primarily as victims of terrorist violence, recent scholarship demonstrates that their roles within Boko Haram and related insurgent networks are more complex. Akpan et al. (2024) argue that women in North-East Nigeria have occupied diverse positions as both victims and participants in Boko Haram's activities, reflecting the interaction of gender, ideology, coercion, and power. Similarly, Shahid and Abwami (2024) show that women have participated in activities including logistics, intelligence gathering, and direct involvement in insurgent operations, with participation shaped by economic pressures, ideological commitment, and coercion. More recently, Akogwu et al. (2025) further demonstrate that women and girls may function as intelligence gatherers, logistical actors, recruiters, negotiators, and, in some cases, participants in violent operations. These findings challenge a purely victim-centred understanding of women's experiences of terrorism and suggest that their relationship with insurgent organisations should be understood along a continuum encompassing victimhood, coercion, agency, and participation.

The cross-border nature of terrorism in northern Nigeria adds to the challenges in tackling the crisis. The porous borders shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon allow insurgent groups to cross national lines easily, obtain arms, and establish secure refuges in isolated regions of the Lake Chad Basin. Consequently, terrorism in northern Nigeria has transformed into a regional security issue demanding united efforts among impacted nations (Akumah & Nomeh, 2025). In reaction to this danger, local governments formed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a joint military effort designed to fight Boko Haram throughout the Lake Chad area. Studies show that the MNJTF has seen success in diminishing insurgent networks and reclaiming areas formerly held by terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, logistical difficulties, poor coordination, and limited resources persist in diminishing the efficacy of the joint force (Akumah & Nomeh, 2025).

Recent scholars have reached differing conclusions on Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts in northern Nigeria. Saka (2024) acknowledges the degradation of Boko Haram's operational capacity but identifies continuing difficulties in achieving sustainable peace. Conversely, Akinbile, Momodu, and Owonikoko (2025**)** report a significant relationship between counter-insurgency strategies and the degradation of Boko Haram activities. Although military actions have greatly diminished the territorial influence of insurgent factions, they have not completely tackled the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism. As stated by Egbuta (2025), Nigeria's strategy for counter-terrorism has frequently emphasized intense military actions while overlooking the essential socio-economic and political changes needed for lasting peace. This dynamic has led some academics to describe a contradiction of "winning the war but losing the peace," where insurgent factions might surrender territory yet still retain influence over underserved communities (Egbuta, 2025).

The effects of terrorism on northern Nigeria have been catastrophic. A significant visible effect is the humanitarian crisis resulting from extensive displacement. Countless individuals have had to leave their residences and find safety in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps throughout the area. These camps frequently encounter significant difficulties such as overcrowding, unsatisfactory sanitation, insufficient healthcare services, and restricted access to education. The devastation of communities, schools, markets, and infrastructure has worsened poverty and underdevelopment in northern Nigeria. The effects of terrorism on northern Nigeria have been catastrophic, particularly through conflict-induced displacement and the resulting humanitarian crisis. In north-east Nigeria, more than 2.2 million internally displaced persons were recorded in 2024, with displaced populations experiencing overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, limited healthcare, food insecurity, and disrupted access to education (IOM, 2025; UNFPA, 2024). The destruction and disruption of homes, livelihoods, schools, and essential infrastructure have further intensified poverty and vulnerability among affected communities (ICRC, 2025; UNICEF, 2025).

Terrorism as the Cause of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Nigeria

Over the past ten years, terrorism has become a major contributor to internal displacement in Northern Nigeria. The actions of extremist organizations like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have led to significant insecurity, devastation of communities, and compelled migration across the area. Consequently, countless civilians have been forced to leave their residences in pursuit of safety in

internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or host communities. Findings from scholars largely concur that terrorism in Northern Nigeria has resulted in significant humanitarian impacts, notably the surge in internal displacement, poverty, and social unrest (Campbell, 2020; Thurston, 2020).

The uprising that started in 2009 has turned northeastern Nigeria into one of the most violence-stricken regions in Africa. Terrorist assaults often entail the devastation of villages, abductions, bombings of marketplaces, and strikes on security agencies, which together foster an environment of dread and unpredictability among the populace (UNHCR, 2024). These brutal methods have compelled whole communities to abandon their homes in order to escape death or oppression. The scale of the resulting displacement is reflected in the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round 51 assessment, conducted between September and October 2025, which identified 2,333,190 internally displaced persons across the six states of northeastern Nigeria: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2025). The figure represents an increase from 2,292,477 internally displaced persons recorded in Round 50 in April 2025 (IOM, 2025). These figures provide empirical evidence of the enduring scale of displacement associated with the conflict and establish the humanitarian context within which the question of remedial responsibility arises.

Numerous researchers have highlighted that displacement caused by terrorism in Northern Nigeria is not just an incidental result of conflict but a calculated effect of insurgent tactics focused on gaining territorial dominance and causing social upheaval. Okoli and Iortyer (2021:23) claim that terrorist organizations frequently carry out violent assaults on civilian areas to undermine local governance systems and establish ungoverned regions where insurgents can operate without restrictions. In a similar fashion, Matfess (2020) notes that Boko Haram's insurgency consistently aims at rural areas, thereby displacing civilians and weakening local economies and social connections. The destruction of homes, farmland, and infrastructure forces affected communities to seek shelter in safer locations.

Alongside the direct danger of violence, terrorism also generates secondary elements that hasten displacement. Armed assaults often devastate agricultural livelihoods, disturb local markets, and dismantle essential social services like schools and healthcare centres. As a consequence, communities are unable to support themselves either financially or socially. This occurrence has been extensively recorded in research on conflict in the Lake Chad Basin, where instability has greatly weakened local agricultural output and trade systems (Onuoha, 2022). The collapse of livelihoods increasingly drives families to migrate within the country to sustain themselves.

Moreover, in Northern Nigeria, terrorism combines with environmental and socio-economic stresses to exacerbate displacement patterns. Olatade and Mogaji (2025) highlight that Nigeria's internal displacement arises not only from environmental causes like climate change but also from violent conflicts that intensify current vulnerabilities. Their research emphasizes how environmental stress, poverty, and armed conflict together create situations that compel individuals to relocate domestically. In this scenario, terrorism acts as a trigger that amplifies the impacts of already vulnerable socio-economic structures.

The humanitarian effects of displacement caused by terrorism are significant. Internally displaced individuals in Northern Nigeria frequently endure harsh living situations in crowded camps or makeshift settlements. These groups often face restricted access to food, healthcare, education, and job opportunities. Oghuvbu (2024) states that the living conditions in numerous IDP camps illustrate the lasting social repercussions of insurgency, such as poverty, psychological distress, and societal breakdown. In these situations, women and children are especially at risk, frequently encountering increased threats of exploitation, gender-based violence, and restricted access to education.

Additionally, the ongoing presence of terrorism has made it more difficult to reintegrate displaced groups into their former communities. Ongoing assaults and instability in the northeastern area hinder resettlement and extend displacement. Numerous communities continue to be devastated or hazardous, hindering displaced individuals from restoring their lives. Researchers like Akinyetun (2022) contend that terrorism in Northern Nigeria has established a cycle of displacement, with insecurity perpetually producing fresh waves of internally displaced people. Thus, terrorism continues to be a leading factor in internal displacement within Northern Nigeria. The aggressive actions of extremist organizations have devastated communities, interrupted livelihoods, and compelled millions to leave their residences. The resulting displacement crisis has created significant humanitarian challenges that continue to undermine regional stability and growth. Tackling the issue demands not just military tactics to fight terrorism but also thorough policies focused on revitalizing communities, aiding displaced individuals, and confronting the fundamental socio-economic weaknesses that permit insurgency to endure.

David Miller's Remedial Responsibility and the Allocation of Duties in Terrorism-Induced Displacement

The ethical issue of who should respond to displacement caused by terrorism in Northern Nigeria necessitates a framework that transcends assigning blame and focuses on justice-driven solutions. David Miller's theory of remedial responsibility provides a framework that redirects focus from past blame to proactive obligations to mend harm and recreate circumstances for human prosperity (Miller, 2001; Miller, 2007). In situations of large-scale displacement due to violent insurgency, offenders are frequently either unwilling or unable to offer compensation. Miller's method allows for the redistribution of responsibility to those actors who can address wrongdoing, guaranteeing that victims are not abandoned in a moral void.

Miller differentiates remedial responsibility from being blameworthy. Causal and moral responsibility determine who inflicted harm, whereas remedial responsibility focuses on who ought to take on the burden of rectification. As Miller (2001) notes, the duty to address injustice can rightly be placed on individuals other than the offenders if it is essential to achieving justice. He suggests various standards for distributing this responsibility: causal involvement, ethical blame, ability to rectify, advantage from the unfairness, and particular connections or associative bonds. These criteria offer a diverse and context-aware foundation for assessing responsibilities in intricate political emergencies.

Utilizing this framework for analyzing displacement due to insurgent violence in Northern Nigeria uncovers a complex hierarchy of accountability. Armed entities like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province carry the main causal and ethical responsibility for community devastation, murders, abductions, and involuntary displacement. Their actions instil fear, insecurity and the breakdown of social and economic life, prompting civilians to escape. Miller's framework acknowledges that offenders might not possess the motivation or the organizational ability to mend the damage they caused. When offenders are unable to offer restitution, accountability should transfer to those who can reestablish justice (Miller, 2007). According to Miller's framework, the Nigerian federal government holds the greatest remedial responsibility. Initially, the state holds a unique political and territorial connection with displaced individuals, based on its sovereignty and constitutional duties to safeguard its citizens. Miller argues that unique ties, like belonging to a political community, create more significant obligations of justice than those owed to outsiders (Miller, 2007). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are still citizens whose rights to safety, protection, and well-being endure even after being displaced. Furthermore, the standard of moral responsibility enhances the state's duty. Although the Nigerian state did not generate insurgent ideology, shortcomings in governance, limited institutional capacity, slow responses to security issues, and inadequate protection measures fostered the circumstances that led to extensive displacement. Miller contends that agents who do not avert predictable harm, despite being empowered and obliged to act, have remedial responsibilities even if they are not the direct offenders (Miller, 2001). Additionally, the federal government meets the requirement of having the ability to provide a solution. It has the military, financial, administrative, and diplomatic means required to restore security, reconstruct infrastructure, and assist with resettlement. Miller emphasizes the importance of capacity, contending that agents who can offer effective remedy may hold responsibility even if they are not causally accountable (Miller, 2007). This suggests responsibilities that go beyond emergency aid to encompass rebuilding, reintegration, and preventing future displacement.

Although the federal government has the primary responsibility for remedies, state governments in affected areas have secondary but urgent obligations. Their closeness to displaced communities and governing power over health, education, housing, and local infrastructure create responsibilities based on ability and unique relationship. Miller's framework does not allow for total transfer of responsibility upward; instead, it allocates it proportionately based on competence and institutional scope. State governments thus have vital responsibilities in managing camps, providing services, rebuilding communities, and ensuring safe returns.

Miller's criterion of associative ties emphasizes the importance of local communities, traditional institutions, and religious groups in the remediation process at the community level. Collective identity, cultural affiliation, and mutual reliance provide ethical justifications for endorsing reintegration, reconciliation, and social recovery. Community-driven mediation and reintegration efforts are crucial for rebuilding trust and averting cycles of exclusion and stigmatization that may extend displacement. Accountability also includes citizens and civil society groups through associative duties stemming from common political membership. Miller (2007) contends that individuals within a political community have a shared accountability for maintaining fair institutions. Civic involvement, humanitarian aid, promotion of responsible governance, and opposition to the stigmatization of displaced individuals exemplify how citizens

engage in restorative justice. Miller's capacity principle extends responsibility beyond the nation-state, including regional and international actors who can support remediation efforts. Regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union have security and peacekeeping systems that can aid stabilization initiatives. Their participation is warranted not only due to geographic closeness but also because of common regional security concerns.

Likewise, global entities like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and international humanitarian organizations have technical knowledge, financial resources, and protective responsibilities. Although they are not primarily accountable, their ability to reduce suffering generates secondary duties based on humanitarian justice and global interconnectedness (Miller, 2007). These duties encompass humanitarian aid, resettlement help, funding for reconstruction, and initiatives aimed at building resilience.

A Millerian framework indicates that accountability for displacement caused by terrorism is neither singular nor so pervasive that it lacks clarity. Rather, it is structured and supportive, guaranteeing that victims' rights are upheld via coordinated efforts. This approach avoids the ethical problem of assigning blame without offering solutions and rejects reducing humanitarian aid to optional philanthropy. By grounding response obligations in justice rather than kindness, remedial responsibility reinterprets displacement as a moral obligation. Additionally, Miller's theory emphasizes that remediation needs to go beyond short-term relief and involve structural change. Sustainable justice necessitates reinstating safety, reviving means of living, reintegrating uprooted communities, and tackling governance issues that allow for repeated displacements. Preventive duties, while not as highlighted in initial statements of remedial responsibility, arise logically from the obligation to prevent the recurrence of harms.

Miller's framework of remedial responsibility offers a philosophically strong foundation for addressing the issue of who should respond to displacement caused by terrorism in Northern Nigeria. Through the incorporation of causal responsibility, moral blame, capacity, and connections, the framework assigns main responsibility to the Nigerian federal government, shared duties to state and local entities, and capacity-related obligations to regional and global partners. This multi-faceted method connects ethical accountability with actionable capability, thus providing a justice-centered route to rebuild dignity, stability, and lasting peace.

Conclusion

Utilizing David Miller's theory of remedial responsibility clarifies the ethical framework concerning terrorism-related displacement in Northern Nigeria by pinpointing who should take action and the reasons behind it. Although insurgent groups hold the main causal and moral accountability for displacement, their failure and lack of intent to remedy the damage they've inflicted require that remedial responsibility be assigned to competent agents. Nigeria's federal government holds the greatest responsibility because of its sovereign power, constitutional obligation to safeguard citizens, and ability to ensure security, reconstruction, and reintegration. Governance failures and lapses in preventive security amplify this responsibility. State governments hold direct responsibilities based on their closeness and governance authority, whereas local communities and traditional bodies assist via social reintegration and reconciliation efforts.

Responsibility goes beyond just national entities. Regional organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union have roles in stabilization and security, whereas the global community carries capacity-driven responsibilities to aid in humanitarian protection and sustainable recovery. Citizens and civil society groups also possess associative obligations grounded in common political membership and human solidarity. A Millerian framework ultimately shifts the reaction to displacement from optional humanitarian assistance to an obligation based on justice, organized across various layers of responsibility. Sustainable remediation necessitates not only immediate assistance but also security overhaul, rebuilding efforts, reintegration, and proactive governance that can tackle the underlying conditions fostering terrorism and displacement. Thus, if responsibility is not distinctly assigned and collectively managed across federal, state, regional, and international levels, displacement will continue as a long-lasting humanitarian emergency. In contrast, a unified responsibility model based on Miller's theory provides a means to regain dignity, reconstruct communities, and ensure lasting peace in Northern Nigeria.

ORCID iD

Damilola Peter Olatade https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1647-7025

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