Property Law in G. W. F. Hegel’s Legal Theory: An Appraisal

Abstract

For Hegel, property is crucial for a person to have firsthand knowledge of freedom as an individual and for the existence of ethical life within a society. This study’s objective is to examine property law in Hegel’s legal theory. The problem that warrants this study is that Hegel’s theory of property law is very sturdy, hardy, and strong against fellow citizens but flinches, recoils, and withers away at the level of the state. The method of this study is analysis. Research findings reveal that for Hegel, the significant end of the state does not consist flatly and unconditionally in the protection of property. For him, the end of the state is the state. Therefore, private property may be subservient to or subdued by a higher domain of right – the state. Finally, this study submits that Hegel’s fundamental conception of the state should be discarded and chucked out because it does not fully protect an institution of private property, as it claims to do, which, in order to protect the property right against fellow citizens, should also protect the same right against the government of the state. This is the only way to make individual rights to private property worth the name. The primary aim of the judiciary is to protect the individual rights of those who come to court for justice from any intruder, interloper, or trespasser, including the state government.