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This paper examines Sartre’s account of self-creation and asks whether, and in what sense, human beings make themselves. It begins with Sartre’s principle that existence precedes essence and examines its ontological basis in his conception of consciousness as a being that does not fully coincide with itself. The paper then analyses freedom, choice and projects as the central means through which individuals continually shape themselves. It further examines the relationship between facticity and transcendence, showing that self-creation always takes place within concrete circumstances that individuals do not choose. The discussion of bad faith demonstrates how individuals may evade responsibility by treating themselves as fixed beings or by denying their capacity for change. The paper argues that Sartrean self-creation should not be understood as unlimited self-invention, but as an ongoing process of self-definition through choice and action within historical, social and material conditions. Drawing on criticisms of Sartre and his later revisions, the paper develops the concept of situated freedom, according to which human agency is real but conditioned. It concludes that self-creation is neither the discovery of a predetermined essence nor creation from nothing, but the continuing process of making something of oneself from circumstances one did not choose. This understanding also extends responsibility for self-creation from the individual to society.
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Ogonnaya, C. K., & Nwadinihu, C. (2026). Sartre and the problem of self-creation: Freedom, Choice and the Making of the Self. Izu: Journal of Critical Perspectives, 4(2), 69. https://doi.org/10.68251/IZU.4.1.9