Who Ought to Act? Applying David Miller’s Remedial Responsibility to Displacement Caused by Terrorism in Northern Nigeria

Abstract

This paper examines the normative question of who ought to act in responding to terrorism-induced displacement in Northern Nigeria through David Miller’s theory of remedial responsibility. The central problem is that the displacement generated by Boko Haram and ISWAP has produced persistent humanitarian and justice concerns, while responsibility for remedying existing harms and preventing their recurrence remains diffuse and inadequately theorised. Although responsibility may initially be attributed to those who causally produce displacement, the agents responsible for causing harm may lack the capacity or willingness to provide effective remedy. Conversely, agents possessing the institutional capacity and political connection necessary for remediation may themselves be implicated in governance failures, inadequate preventive security, or other conditions that contribute to vulnerability. This creates a philosophical problem concerning the allocation, legitimacy, and accountability of remedial responsibility. Using a normative philosophical methodology grounded in conceptual analysis and critical application of Miller’s account to the Nigerian context, the paper examines causal contribution, moral fault, capacity, and special connection as criteria for determining who ought to assume responsibility for displaced populations. The findings indicate that while terrorist organisations bear primary causal and moral responsibility for displacement, their lack of remedial capacity makes it necessary to assign substantial responsibility to the Nigerian state and other capable institutional actors. However, the state’s position as both principal remedial agent and an institution potentially implicated in conditions that sustain vulnerability generates a culpable-remediator problem requiring stronger mechanisms of accountability, independent oversight, and appropriately structured regional and international support. The paper further argues that Miller’s remedial framework, though primarily concerned with responding to completed harms, can be philosophically developed to accommodate a forward-looking preventive dimension grounded particularly in capacity, special connection, and the reasonable foreseeability of serious harm. Preventive responsibility, on this account, does not require agents to guarantee the elimination of terrorism but imposes proportionate duties to reduce foreseeable risks of displacement and protect vulnerable populations. The paper contributes to the philosophical literature on responsibility by developing a preventive extension of remedial responsibility while clarifying the moral limits of assigning primary remedial authority to institutions that may themselves bear partial responsibility for conditions of harm. It thereby proposes a framework of responsibility that connects remediation, prevention, institutional accountability, and the protection of displaced populations within the Nigerian context.